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We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise 
preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their 
preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to 
declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison. This freedom is then 
gradually restricted as we specify six stages of orderedness in the preferences, ending 
with the classical case of strictly ordered lists.We study all cases occurring when 
combining the three known notions of stability—weak, strong and super-stability—
under the assumption that each side of the bipartite market obtains one of the six 
degrees of orderedness. By designing three polynomial algorithms and two NP-
completeness proofs we determine the complexity of all cases not yet known, and 
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Páronkénti preferenciák a stabil párosítás problémában 
CSEH ÁGNES – JUHOS ATTILA 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ 
A klasszikus stabil párosítás problémát tanulmányozzuk páronként megadott 
preferenciákkal. A legáltalánosabb esetben a játékosok úgy közlik a preferenciáikat, 
hogy tetszőleges két élüket összehasonlítják egymással. Egy ilyen összehasonlítás 
eredménye lehet döntetlen is, sőt, a játékos azt is kinyilatkoztathatja, hogy nem képes 
összehasonlítani a két élt. Ezt a nagy szabadságfokot lépésről lépésre csökkentjük, 
ahogy hat fokozat definiálásával eljutunk a klasszikus, szigorú listás rendezésig. 
Minden esetet tanulmányozunk a három ismert (gyenge, erős, és szuper) 
stabilitásdefiníció esetében – feltételezvén, hogy a páros gráf egyik osztálya az egyik, 
míg a másik osztály egy másik rendezettségi fokozatban adja meg a preferenciáit. 
Három polinomiális algoritmus és két NP-teljességi bizonyítás segítségével az összes, 
eddig még ismeretlen eset bonyolultságát meghatározzuk, ezzel pontos határvonalat 
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Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem
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We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general
setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also
have the right to declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison. This freedom is then gradually
restricted as we specify six stages of orderedness in the preferences, ending with the classical case of strictly
ordered lists. We study all cases occurring when combining the three known notions of stability—weak, strong
and super-stability—under the assumption that each side of the bipartite market obtains one of the six degrees
of orderedness. By designing three polynomial algorithms and two NP-completeness proofs we determine
the complexity of all cases not yet known, and thus give an exact boundary in terms of preference structure
between tractable and intractable cases.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the 2016 USA Presidential Elections, polls unequivocally reported Democratic presidential
nominee Bernie Sanders to be more popular than Republican candidate Donald Trump [39, 40].
However, Sanders was beaten by Hillary Clinton in their own party’s primary election cycle, thus
the 2016 Democratic National Convention endorsed Clinton to be the Democrat’s candidate. In
the Presidential Elections, Trump defeated Clinton. This recent example demonstrates well how
inconsistent pairwise preferences can be.
Preferences play an essential role in the stable marriage problem and its extensions. In the
classical setting [14], each man and woman expresses their preferences on the members of the
opposite gender by providing a strictly ordered list. A set of marriages is stable if no pair of agents
blocks it. A man and a woman form a blocking pair if they mutually prefer one another to their
respective spouses.
Requiring strict preference orders in the stable marriage problem is a strong assumption, which
rarely suits real world scenarios [6]. The study of less restrictive preference structures has been
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flourishing [3, 11, 19, 23, 26, 32] for decades. As soon as one allows for ties in preference lists, the
definition of a blocking edge needs to be revisited. In the literature, three intuitive definitions
are used, each of which defines weakly, strongly and super stable matchings. According to weak
stability, a matching is blocked by an edge uw if agents u andw both strictly prefer one another to
their partners in the matching. A strongly blocking edge is preferred strictly by one end vertex,
whereas it is not strictly worse than the matching edge at the other end vertex. A blocking edge is
at least as good as the matching edge for both end vertices in the super stable case. Super stable
matchings are strongly stable and strongly stable matchings are weakly stable by definition.
Weak stability is an intuitive notion that is most aligned with the classical blocking edge definition
in the model defined by Gale and Shapley [14]. However, reaching strong stability is the goal to
achieve in many applications, such as college admission programs. In most countries, students
need to submit a strict ordering in the application procedure, but colleges are not able to rank all
applicants strictly, hence large ties occur in their lists. According to the equal treatment policy
used in Chile and Hungary for example, it may not occur that a student is rejected from a college
preferred by him, even though other students with the same score are admitted [7, 35]. Other
countries, such as Ireland [9], break ties with lottery, which gives way to a weakly stable solution.
Super stable matchings are admittedly less relevant in applications, however, they represent worst-
case scenarios if uncertain information is given about the agents’ preferences. If two edges are
incomparable to each other due to incomplete information derived from the agent, then it is exactly
the notion of a super stable matching that guarantees stability, no matter what the agent’s true
preferences are.
The goal of our present work is to investigate the three cases of stability in the presence of
preference structures that are more general than ties.
1.1 Related work
It is an empirical fact that cyclic and intransitive preferences often emerge in the broad topic of
voting and representation, if the set of voters differs for some pairwise comparisons [2], such as in
our earlier example with the polls on the Clinton–Sanders–Trump battle. Preference aggregation is
another field that often yields intransitive group preferences, as the famous Condorcet-paradox [10]
also demonstrates.
It might be less known that nontrivial preference structures naturally emerge in the preferences of
individuals as well. The study of cyclic and intransitive preferences of a person has been inspiring
scientists from a wide range of fields for decades. Blavatsky [8] demonstrated that in choice
situations under risk, the overwhelming majority of individuals expresses intransitive choice and
violation of standard consistency requirements. Humphrey [17] found that cyclic preferences persist
even when the choice triple is repeated for the second time. Using MRI scanners, neuroscientists
identified brain regions encoding ‘local desirability’, which led to clear, systematic and predictable
intransitive choices of the participants of the experiment [25]. Cyclic and intransitive preferences
occur naturally in multi-attribute comparisons [12, 34]. May [34] studied the choice on a prospective
partner and found that a significant portion of the participants expressed the same cyclic preference
relations if candidates lacking exactly one of the three properties intelligence, looks, and wealth
were offered at pairwise comparisons. In this paper, we investigate the stable marriage problem
equipped with the ubiquitous and well-studied preference structures of pairwise preferences that
might be intransitive or cyclic.
Regarding the stable marriage problem, all three notions of stability have been thoroughly
investigated if preferences are given in the form of a partially ordered set, a list with ties, or
a strict list [14, 19, 23, 26, 32, 33]. Weakly stable matchings always exist and can be found in
polynomial time [32], and a super stable matching or a proof for its non-existence can also be
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produced in polynomial time [19, 33]. The most sophisticated ideas are needed in the case of strong
stability, which turned out to be solvable in polynomial time if both sides have tied preferences [19].
Irving [19] remarked that “Algorithms that we have described can easily be extended to the more
general problem in which each person’s preferences are expressed as a partial order. This merely
involves interpreting the ‘head’ of each person’s (current) poset as the set of source nodes, and
the ‘tail’ as the set of sink nodes, in the corresponding directed acyclic graph.” Together with his
coauthors, he refuted this statement for strongly stable matchings and showed that exchanging
ties for posets actually makes the strongly stable marriage problem NP-complete [23]. We show
in this paper that the intermediate case, namely when one side has ties, while the other side has
posets, is solvable in polynomial time.
Beyond posets, studies on the stablemarriage problemwith general preferences occur sporadically.
These we include in Table 1 to give a structured overview on them. Intransitive, but acyclic
preference lists were permitted by Abraham [1], who connects the stable roommates problem with
the maximum size weakly stable marriage problem with intransitive, acyclic preference lists in
order to derive a structural perspective. Aziz et al. [3] discussed the stable marriage problem under
uncertain pairwise preferences. They also considered the case of certain, but cyclic preferences and
showed that deciding whether a weakly stable matching exists is NP-complete if both sides can
have cycles in their preferences. Strongly and super stable matchings were discussed by Farczadi
et al. [11]. Throughout their paper they assumed that one side has strict preferences, and proved
that finding a strongly or a super stable matching (or proving that none exists) can be done in
polynomial time if the other side has cyclic lists, where cycles of length at least 3 are permitted to
occur, but the problems become NP-complete as soon as cycles of length 2 are also allowed.
1.2 Our contribution
This paper aims to provide a coherent framework for the complexity of the stable marriage problem
under various preference structures. We consider the three known notions of stability: weak, strong
and super. In our analysis we distinguish six stages of entropy in the preference lists; strict lists,
lists with ties, posets, acyclic pairwise preferences, asymmetric pairwise preferences and arbitrary
pairwise preferences. All of these have been defined in earlier papers, along with some results on
them. Here we collect and organize these known results in all three notions of stability, considering
six cases of orderedness for each side of the bipartite graph. Table 1 summarizes these results. Rows
and columns distinguish between preference relations considered on the two sides of the graph.
The cell itself shows the complexity class of determining whether the specified problem admits a
stable matching.
Each of the three tables contained unfilled cells, i.e. cases with unknown complexity so far. These
are denoted by colored cells in Table 1. We fill all gaps, providing two NP-completeness proofs
and three polynomial time algorithms. Interestingly, the three tables have the border between
polynomial time and NP-complete cases at very different places. As a byproduct of our new proofs,
we are able to answer all analogous complexity questions in the non-bipartite stable roommates
problem as well (see Table 2 in Section 6).
Structure of the paper. We define the problem variants formally in Section 2. Weak, strong
and super stable matchings are then discussed in Sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we
focus on non-bipartite instances, and then conclude with an open problem in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In the stable marriage problem we are given a not necessarily complete bipartite graph G =
(U ∪W ,E), where vertices inU represent men, vertices inW represent women, and edges mark
the acceptable relationships between them. Each person v ∈ U ∪W specifies a set Rv of pairwise
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: January 2020.
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WEAK strict ties poset acyclic asymmetric or arbitrary
strict O (m) [14] O (m) [19] O (m) [32] O (m) NPC
ties O (m) [19] O (m) [32] O (m) NPC
poset O (m) [32] O (m) NPC
acyclic O (m) NPC
asymmetric or arbitrary NPC [3]
STRONG strict ties poset acyclic asymmetric arbitrary
strict O (m) [14] O (m) [19, 26] O (m) [11] O (m) [11] O (m) [11] NPC [11]













poset NPC [23] NPC [23] NPC [23] NPC [23]
acyclic NPC [23] NPC [23] NPC [23]
asymmetric NPC [23] NPC [23]
arbitrary NPC [23]
SUPER strict ties poset acyclic asymm. arbitrary
strict O (m) [14] O (m) [19] O (m) [19, 33] O (m) [11] O (m) [11] NPC [11]


















acyclic NPC NPC NPC [11]
asymmetric NPC NPC [11]
arbitrary NPC [11]
Table 1. The complexity tables for weak, strong and super-stability. For the sake of conciseness, NP-
completeness is shortened to NPC. The number of agents in the input is denoted by n, while m stands
for the number of acceptable pairs. Each blank cell under the diagonal of the table represents the same
case—and thus has the same complexity—as the cell mirrored to the diagonal. All of our positive results also
deliver a stable matching or a proof for its nonexistence.
comparisons on the vertices adjacent to them. These comparisons as ordered pairs define four
possible relations between two vertices a and b in the neighborhood of v .
(1) a is preferred to b, while b is not preferred to a by v : a ≺v b;
(2) a is not preferred to b, while b is preferred to a by v : a ≻v b;
(3) a is not preferred to b, neither is b preferred to a by v : a | |vb;
(4) a is preferred to b, so is b preferred to a by v : a ∼v b.
In words, the first two relations express that an agentv prefers one agent strictly to the other. The
third option is interpreted as incomparability, or a not yet known relation between the two agents.
The last relation indicates that v is certain that the two options are equally good. For example, if
v is a sports sponsor considering to offer a contract to exactly one of players a and b, then v’s
preferences are described by these four relations in the following scenarios: a has beaten b, b has
beaten a, a and b have not yet played against each other, and finally, a and b have played a draw. A
more precise mathematical interpretation of the four relations is based on the set Rv of pairwise
comparisons: the first one is equivalent to (a,b) ∈ Rv , but (b,a) < Rv , the second one is exactly
the other way round: (a,b) < Rv , but (b,a) ∈ Rv , the third one indicates that (a,b) < Rv , and
(b,a) < Rv , and finally, the last one is (a,b) ∈ Rv , and (b,a) ∈ Rv .
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Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem 5
We say that edge va is strictly preferred to edge vb if a ≺v b. If a ≺v b or a | |vb, then b is not
preferred to a. This happens if and only if (b,a) < Rv . For our previous example with players a
and b, this relation delivers the information that either a has beaten b or they have not yet played.
With this amount of somewhat uncertain information, the sports sponsor has no reason to choose
b, but choosing a also involves risk, because it might still be the case that the two players have
not played against each other yet, and b could beat a. For two out of the three notions of stability,
we will define blocking based on this risk. Another choice would be to replace a | |vb by a ∼v b in
the definition above, which then would be equivalent to (a,b) ∈ Rv . While it would lead to an
equally correct model, we chose incomparability over being equally good consciously. Some early
papers [19, 20] do not distinguish between two agents being incomparable and equally good, while
some others in the more recent literature [3, 11] motivate strong and super-stability with uncertain
information. Our definition fits the more recent framework.
The partner of vertex v in matchingM is denoted byM(v). The neighborhood of v in graphG is
denoted by NG (v) and it consists of all vertices that are adjacent to v in G. Analogously, NG (X )
denotes the neighborhood of vertex set X ⊆ V and it consists of all vertices that are adjacent to at
least one vertex x ∈ X in G. To ease notation, we introduce the empty set as a possible partner to
each vertex, symbolizing the vertex remaining unmatched in a matchingM (M(v) = ∅). As usual,
being matched to any acceptable vertex is preferred to not being matched at all: a ≺v ∅ for every
a ∈ N(v). Edges to unacceptable partners do not exist, thus these are not in a pairwise relation to
each other or to edges incident to v .
We differentiate six degrees of preference orderedness in our study.
(1) The strictest, classical two-sided model [14] requires each vertex to rank all of its neighbors
in a strict order of preference. For each vertex, this translates to a transitive, antisymmetric
and complete set of pairwise relations (a,b) ∈ Rv on all adjacent vertices of v .
(2) This model has been relaxed very early to lists admitting ties [19]. The pairwise preferences
of vertexv form a preference list with ties if the neighbors ofv can be clustered into some sets
N1,N2, . . . ,Nk so that vertices in the same set are incomparable, while for any two vertices
in different sets, the vertex in the set with the lower index is strictly preferred to the other
one.
(3) Following the traditions [13, 20, 23, 32], the third degree of orderedness we define is when
preferences are expressed as partially ordered sets (posets). Any set of antisymmetric and
transitive pairwise relations (a,b) ∈ Rv by definition forms a poset.
(4) By dropping transitivity of (a,b) ∈ Rv , but still keeping the structure cycle-free, we arrive to
acyclic preferences [1]. This category allows for example a | |vc , if a ≺v b ≺v c , but it excludes
a ∼v c and a ≻v c .
(5) Asymmetric preferences [11] may contain cycles of length at least 3. This is equivalent to
dropping acyclicity from the previous cluster, but still prohibiting the indifference relation
a ∼v b, which is essentially a 2-cycle in the form (a,b) ∈ Rv , (b,a) ∈ Rv .
(6) Finally, an arbitrary set of pairwise preferences can also be allowed [3, 11].
A matching is stable if it admits no blocking edge. For strict preferences, a blocking edge was
defined in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [14]: an edge uv < M blocks matchingM if both
u and v prefer each other to their partner inM or they are unmatched. Already when extending
this notion to preference lists with ties, one needs to specify how to deal with incomparability.
Irving [19] defined three notions of stability. We extend them to pairwise preferences in the coming
three sections. We omit the adjectives weakly, strongly, and super wherever there is no ambiguity
about the type of stability in question.
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We define the NP-complete [4] satisfiability problem (2,2)-e3-sat here, because it will be used in
the proofs of Theorems 3.4 and 5.5 later. Its input is a Boolean formula B in conjunctive normal
form, in which each clause comprises exactly 3 literals and each variable appears exactly twice in
positive and exactly twice in negated form. The decision question is whether there exists a truth
assignment that satisfies B.
3 WEAK STABILITY
In weak stability, an edge outside ofM blocksM if it is strictly preferred to the matching edge by
both of its end vertices. From this definition follows thatw ∼u w ′ andw | |uw ′ are exchangeable in
weak stability, because blocking occurs only if the non-matching edge is strictly preferred to the
matching edges at both end vertices. Therefore, an instance with arbitrary pairwise preferences
can be assumed to be asymmetric.
Definition 3.1 (blocking edge for weak stability). Edge uw blocksM , if
(1) uw < M ;
(2) w ≺u M(u);
(3) u ≺w M(w).
For weak stability, preference structures up to posets have been investigated, see Table 1. A
stable solution is guaranteed to exist in these cases [19, 32]. Here we extend this result to acyclic
lists, and complement it with a hardness proof for all cases where asymmetric lists appear, even if
they do so on one side only.
Theorem 3.2. Any instance of the stable marriage problem with acyclic pairwise preferences for all
vertices admits a weakly stable matching, and there is a polynomial time algorithm to determine such
a matching.
Proof. We utilize a widely used argument [19] to show this. A linear extension of an acyclic
set R of pairwise relations on a finite set V = (v1,v2, . . . ,vn) of n elements is a total ordering
π = π1,π2, . . . ,πn of V such that πi < πj whenever vi ≺ vj appears in R. For acyclic relations Rv ,
a linear extension R ′v of Rv exists. The extended instance with linear preferences is guaranteed
to admit a stable matching [14]. Compared to Rv , relations in R ′v impose more constraints on
stability, therefore, they can only restrict the original set of weakly stable solutions. If both sides
have acyclic lists, a stable matching is thus guaranteed to exist and a single run of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm on the extended instance delivers one.
The time complexity of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in the instance with extended preferences
is O (m). Constructing a linear extension to a set of acyclic relations at each vertex is part of a
pre-processing phase, as in [32]. The complexity of this phase heavily depends on the format of R ′v




serves as an upper bound for the whole graph [24]. □
Stable matchings are not guaranteed to exist as soon as a cycle appears in the preferences, as
Example 3.3 demonstrates. Theorem 3.4 shows that the decision problem is in fact hard from that
point on.
Example 3.3. No stable matching can be found in the following instance with strict lists on one
side and asymmetric lists on the other side. There are three men u1,u2,u3 adjacent to one womanw .
The woman’s pairwise preferences are cyclic: u1 ≺ u2,u2 ≺ u3,u3 ≺ u1. Any stable matching
M must consist of a single edge. Since the men’s preferences are identical, we can assume that
M = {u1w} without loss of generality. Then u3w blocksM .
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Theorem 3.4. If one side has strict lists, while the other side has asymmetric pairwise preferences,
then determining whether a weakly stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if each agent finds at
most four other agents acceptable.
Proof. The NP-complete problem we reduce to our problem is (2,2)-e3-sat [4], defined in Sec-
tion 2. When constructing graphG to a given Boolean formula B, we keep track of the three literals
in each clause and the two positive and two negated appearances of each variable. Each appearance
is represented by an interconnecting edge, running between the corresponding variable and clause
gadget. The graphs underlying our gadgets resemble gadgets in earlier hardness proofs [5], but
the preferences are designed specifically for our problem. Figure 1 illustrates our construction, in
particular, the preference relations in it.
t : strict list: x ≺ x̄
f : strict list: x̄ ≺ x
x : f ≺ t , t ≺ u,u ≺ f
x̄ : t ≺ f , t ≺ u,u ≺ f
u1 : strict list:w3 ≺ w2 ≺ x/x̄ ≺ w1
u2 : strict list:w3 ≺ w2 ≺ x/x̄ ≺ w1






























Fig. 1. A variable gadget to the left and a clause gadget to the right. Strict lists are to be found at t , f , and
u-vertices, while the rest of the vertices have asymmetric relations. The elements u and x/x̄ in the lists stand
for the corresponding ui and x or x̄ vertices, respectively. Interconnecting edges are dashed. The exact clause
is expressed by the connections established by these interconnecting edges. The arrows point to the strictly
preferred edge, while dotted lines denote incomparability.
To each variable x in B, we create 4 vertices: t , x̄ , f , and x . To each clause in B, we create 6
vertices: u1,u2,u3,w1,w2, andw3.
In each variable gadget, x symbolizes the two positive occurrences of the variable, while x̄ stands
for the two negated occurrences. The edge set of each variable gadget comprises a 4-cycle t , x̄ , f ,x
and four interconnecting edges, two of which are incident to x , and the remaining two are adjacent
to x̄ . These four interconnecting edges are responsible for the communication between clause and
variable gadgets and they connect the vertices x and x̄ to u-vertices in clause gadgets.
The clause gadget consists of a complete bipartite graph on six vertices u1,u2,u3,w1,w2, andw3,
where each vertex on the u-side is equipped with exactly one interconnecting edge. This side
represents the three literals in the clause. Each interconnecting edge runs from the u-vertex to
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vertex x or x̄ in the variable gadget of the literal. If the literal is positive, then the other end vertex
of this edge is x in the corresponding variable gadget, otherwise it is x̄ .
The two sides of the bipartite graph will be formed by vertices t , f ,u1,u2,u3 from all gadgets
on one side, and x , x̄ ,w1,w2,w3 from all gadgets on the other side. Edges inside variable gadgets
connect vertices t , f with vertices x , x̄ , edges inside clause gadgets connect vertices u1,u2,u3 with
verticesw1,w2,w3, and finally, interconnecting edges connect vertices u1,u2,u3 with vertices x , x̄ .
This guarantees the bipartite property of the constructed graph.
Claim 1. If there is a weakly stable matchingM inG , then there is a truth assignment that satisfies B.
Proof. We first show that M does not contain any interconnecting edge by proving that all
stable matchings include either {tx , f x̄} or { f x , tx̄}, for each variable gadget. Two cases may occur.
• If tx ∈ M , then f x̄ ∈ M , otherwise f x blocksM .
• If tx < M , then f x ∈ M , otherwise tx blocksM . Furthermore, tx̄ ∈ M , otherwise tx̄ blocksM .
We know that all weakly stable matchings are inclusionwise maximal by definition. From this fact
and our arguments above follows thatM restricted to an arbitrary clause gadget must be a perfect
matching. The preferences in the clause gadgets are set so that out of the three interconnecting edges
running to a clause gadget, exactly one is strictly preferred toM at the clause gadget, namely the
edge incident to vertex ui matched tow1. We know thatM is stable, therefore, this interconnecting
edge xui or x̄ui may not be strictly preferred to the matching edge at its other end vertex x or x̄ .
This is only possible if the variable represented by the vertex ui is set to
• true if the literal was positive in the clause to which ui belongs, and the end vertex above
was x ;
• false if the literal was in negated form in the clause to which ui belongs, and the end vertex
above was x̄ .
Thus, we have found a satisfied literal in each clause. □
Claim 2. If there is a truth assignment that satisfies B, then there is a stable matchingM in G.
Proof. In each variable gadget that belongs to a true variable, {tx , f x̄} is chosen, whereas all
gadgets corresponding to a false variable contribute the edges { f x , tx̄}. In each clause, there is at
least one true literal. We match the vertex representing the appearance of this literal to w1 and
matchw2 andw3 arbitrarily.
No edge inside of a gadget blocks M , because it is a perfect matching inside each gadget and
the preferences either form a cycle (variable gadget), or one side is indifferent (clause gadget). An
interconnecting edge is strictly preferred to M at the clause gadget if and only if it corresponds
to the chosen literal satisfying the clause. Our rules set exactly this literal to be satisfied in the
variable gadget, i.e. this literal is matched to t , which is strictly preferred to the corresponding
interconnecting edge. □
With this, we have completed our hardness proof. □
4 STRONG STABILITY
In strong stability, an edge outside ofM blocksM if it is strictly preferred to the matching edge by
one of its end vertices, while the other end vertex does not prefer its matching edge to it.
Definition 4.1 (blocking edge for strong stability). Edge uw blocksM , if
(1) uw < M ;
(2) w ≺u M(u) orw | |uM(u);
(3) u ≺w M(w),
or
(1) uw < M ;
(2) w ≺u M(u);
(3) u ≺w M(w) or u | |wM(w).
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The largest set of relevant publications has appeared on strong stability, yet gaps were present
in the complexity table, see Table 1. In this section we present a polynomial algorithm that is
valid in all cases not yet resolved. We assume men to have preference lists with ties, and women
to have asymmetric relations. Our algorithm returns a strongly stable matching or a proof for
its nonexistence. It can be seen as an extended version of Irving’s algorithm for strongly stable
matchings in instances with ties on both sides [19]. Our contribution is a sophisticated rejection
routine, which is necessary here, because of the lack of transitivity of preferences on the women’s
side. The algorithm in [11] solves the problem for strict lists on the men’s side, and it is much
simpler than ours. It was designed for super stable matchings, but strong and super stability do not
differ if one side has strict lists. As soon as we allow ties instead of strict lists on the men’s side, the
two sets of matchings differ, and thus it will not be sufficient to apply an algorithm designed for
super-stability.
4.1 Our algorithm
Intuitively, our algorithm alternates between two phases, both of which iteratively eliminate
edges that cannot occur in a strongly stable matching. In the first phase, Gale-Shapley proposals
and rejections happen, while the second phase focuses on finding a vertex set violating the Hall
condition in a specified subgraph. Finally, if no edge can be eliminated any more, then we show that
every maximum matching is either stable or it is a proof for the non-existence of stable matchings.
Algorithm 1 and it subroutine Algorithm 2 below provide a pseudocode.
The second phase of the algorithm relies on the notion of the critical set in a bipartite graph, also
utilized in [19], which we sketch here. For an exhaustive description we refer the reader to [30].
The well-known Hall-condition [16] states that there is a matching covering the entire vertex setU
if and only if for each X ⊆ U , |N(X )| ≥ |X |. Intuitively, the reason for no matching being able to
cover all the vertices inU is that a subset X of them has too few neighbors inW to cover X . The
difference δ (X ) = |X | − |N(X )| is called the deficiency of X . It is straightforward that for any X ⊆ U ,
at least δ (X ) vertices in X cannot be covered by any matching in G, if δ (X ) > 0. Let δ (G) denote
the maximum deficiency over all subsets ofU . Since δ (∅) = 0, we know that δ (G) ≥ 0. Moreover, it
can be shown that the size of a maximum matching is ν (G) = |U | − δ (G). If we let Z1,Z2 be two
arbitrary subsets ofU realizing the maximum deficiency, then Z1 ∩ Z2 has maximum deficiency
as well (see [30, Lemmas 1.3.2 and 1.3.3]). Therefore, the intersection of all maximum-deficiency
subsets ofU is the unique set with maximum deficiency with the following properties: it has the
smallest cardinality and it is contained in all other subsets with maximum deficiency. This set is
called the critical set ofG . Last but not least, it is computationally easy to determine the critical set,
since for any maximum matchingM in G, the critical set consists of vertices inU not covered by
M and vertices inU reachable from the uncovered ones via an alternating path.
We are now ready to state our theorem on our algorithm.
Theorem 4.2. If one side has tied preferences, while the other side has asymmetric pairwise prefer-
ences, then deciding whether the instance admits a strongly stable matching (and outputting one, if so)





Initialization.We assume men to have tied lists, while women provide asymmetric pairwise
preferences. For the clarity of our proofs, we add a dummy partnerwu to the bottom of the list of
each man u, wherewu is not acceptable to any other man (line 1). We call the modified instance I ′.
This standard technical modification is to ensure that all men are matched in all stable matchings.
At start, all edges are inactive (line 2). The possible states of an edge and the transitions between
them are illustrated in Figure 2.
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Algorithm 1 Strongly stable matching with ties and asymmetric relations
Input: I = (U ,W ,E,RU ,RW ); RU : lists with ties, RW : asymmetric.
INITIALIZATION
1: for each u ∈ U add an extra womanwu at the end of his list;wu is only acceptable for u
2: set all edges to be inactive
PHASE 1
3: while there exists a man with no active edge do
4: strong_reject()
5: propose along all edges of each u with no active edge in the next tie on his list
6: for each new proposal edge uw do




10: let GA be the graph of active edges with V (GA) = U ∪W
11: letU ′ ⊆ U be the critical set of men with respect to GA
12: if U ′ , ∅ then
13: all active edges of each u ∈ U ′ are rejected
14: goto PHASE 1
15: end if
OUTPUT
16: let M be a maximum matching in GA
17: if M covers all women who have ever had an active edge then
18: STOP, OUTPUTM ∩ E and “There is a strongly stable matching.”
19: else
20: STOP, OUTPUT “There is no strongly stable matching.”
21: end if
Algorithm 2 strong_reject()
22: let R = U
23: while R has an element u with no active edge do
24: reject all u ′w such thatw is in the proposal tie of u and u ′ | |wu
25: if u ′w was active, then let R := R ∪ {u ′}
26: let R := R \ {u}
27: end while
First phase. The first phase of our algorithm (lines 3-9) imitates the classical Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance procedure. In the first round, line 4 induces no change, and each unmatched
man simultaneously proposes to all women in his top tie (line 5). The so far inactive edges that now
carry a proposal are called active proposal edges, or just active edges. Active edges stay active as long
as they are accepted by the woman they run to, and they become rejected proposal edges as soon as
they are rejected by her. The tie that a man has just proposed along is called the man’s proposal
tie. If all edges in the proposal tie are rejected (or more precisely, they become rejected proposal
edges), then the man steps down on his list and proposes along all edges in the tie following the
rejected tie in the man’s preference order (lines 3 and 5).
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Proposals cause two types of rejections in the graph (lines 4 and 7), based on the rules below.
Notice that these rules are more sophisticated than in the Gale-Shapley or Irving algorithms [14, 19].
The most striking difference may be that rejected edges are not deleted from the graph, since they
can very well carry a proposal later, which proposal then affects the state of other edges by triggering
rejections. To be fully accurate, inactive edges that are rejected become rejected inactive edges (see
Figure 2). Upon carrying a proposal later, they are converted to a rejected proposal edge. This latter
is the same state an edge ends up in if it is first proposed along and then rejected.
Edges that carry a proposal in the current round, but have not carried a proposal in earlier rounds,
i.e. edges that moved along the solid arrows in Figure 2 in this round, are called new proposal edges
(lines 5-6). We remind the reader that these edges might or might not be active, depending on
whether they have been rejected earlier.
• Rejections in line 7: For each new proposal edgeuw ,w rejects all edges to whichuw is strictly
preferred (lines 6-8). Note again thatuw might have been rejected earlier than being proposed
along, in which case uw is a proposal edge without being active.
• Rejections in line 4: A precise rejection routine is described in the procedure strong_reject()
in our pseudocode (Algorithm 2), where women reject edges incomparable to their already
rejected proposal edges coming from men who are on the verge of proposing to women in
their next tie (line 5). More precisely, we search for a man in the set R of men, whose set of
active edges is empty (line 23). If such a man u is found, then all edges that are incident to
any neighborw of u in his—now fully rejected—proposal tie and incomparable to uw atw
are rejected. If man u ′ has lost an active edge in the previous operation, then u ′ is added back
to the set R of men to be investigated in later rounds (line 25).
As mentioned earlier, men without any active edge proceed to propose along the next tie in their
list. These operations are executed until there is no more edge to propose along or to reject, which
marks the end of the first phase. It is straightforward that this process will eventually halt and the
execution will undoubtedly proceed to the second phase, since each dummy woman finds her sole
adjacent man acceptable, who thus cannot be rejected by this woman.
Second phase. In the second phase, the set of active edges induce the graph GA, on which we
examine the critical setU ′ ⊆ U (lines 10-11). IfU ′ is not empty, then all active edges of each u ∈ U ′
are rejected (line 13). The mass rejections in line 13 generate a new proposal tie for at least one
man, returning our algorithm to the first phase (line 14), where strong_reject() will be called
before new proposals happen. Note that an empty critical set leads to producing the output, which
is described just below.
Output. In the final set of active edges, an arbitrary maximum matchingM is calculated (line 16).
IfM covers all women who have ever had an active edge, then we send it to the output (lines 17-18),
otherwise we report that no stable matching exists (lines 19-20).
Before proving the correctness of the presented algorithm, we outline an illustrative example
and the corresponding execution in Example 4.3.
Example 4.3. The instance under examination (depicted in Figure 3) consists of six men and
an equal number of women. As expected, men’s preferences make up lists with ties, while the
preference structures associated to women form asymmetric relations. Throughout the entire figure,
edges connected by dotted arcs represent incomparability, e.g.w2 declares incomparability between
m1 andm4. On the other hand, arrows mark strict preferences. For instance,w1 strictly prefersm2
tom1.
In case of men, the order of ties is clearly marked by numbers. For example,m1 likes womenw1
andw2 the most, ranksw3 andw4 second, and considers womanw5 as his least preferred choice. The
preferences of womenw2,w3,w4 andw6 can be represented by ties, hence the same interpretations
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w rejects
Fig. 2. The possible states of an edge uw in Algorithm 1. The solid gray edges between the states symbolize
proposals coming from men, while the dotted black edges mark the rejections initiated by women. Edges
that have neither been proposed along nor rejected are inactive. If a proposal is called first, then the edge
moves along the upper path in the figure and becomes an active proposal edge. It can stay in this state until
termination, or become a rejected proposal edge upon rejection. Otherwise, if the edge is rejected before a
proposal is sent along it, the lower path is taken, and the edge becomes a rejected inactive edge, which might
still carry a proposal later and become rejected proposal edge, but it will not necessarily be the case for all
































Fig. 3. The input for Example 4.3. Colored dashed edges mark the final matching.
of dotted lines and numbers apply as for the men. Womanw1 possesses an asymmetric preference
structure:m4 is strictly preferred to each man acceptable tow1, whilem1,m2, andm3 form a cycle.
Last but not least, womanw5 has an intransitive preference structure as well:m1 is strictly preferred
tom5, who is strictly preferred tom6, yetm1 andm6 are considered incomparable.
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Now we turn to the execution of our algorithm. To keep the figure as clear as possible, we forgo
introducing dummy women. In fact, none of these women will be proposed to during the execution
on this instance. Also, to keep the explanatory text short, we execute the Phase 1 proposal steps of
several agents in batch.
Phase 1, rejections in line 4: At start, the proposal tie of each man is void, thus this step is
passed.
Phase 1, proposals in line 5: Since no man has an active edge at the beginning, each man
proposes to all women in his first tie. More precisely,m1 proposes tow1 andw2,m2 proposes tow1,
m3 tow1,m4 tow2,m5 tow5, andm6 tow6 (lines 3 and 5). These edges become active edges (see
Figure 2).
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: Women check their preferences and reject all edges to which
any of the proposal edges is strictly preferred to. In this mannerw1 rejectsm3, since she strictly
prefers m1 to m3 (i.e. m1 ≺w1 m3), rejects m1, since m2 ≺w1 m1 and rejects m2 as well, because
m3 ≺w1 m2. These edges, having already been proposed along and subsequently rejected, become
rejected proposal edges. For similar reasons,w5 rejectsm6 in advance, thus edgem6w5 becomes a
rejected inactive edge.
Phase 1, rejections in line 4: Twomen are left without a active edge:m2 andm3. Their proposal
tie is identical and it consists ofw1 only. Since no man is incomparable to eitherm2 orm3 according
to the preferences ofw1, no rejection occurs.
Phase 1, proposals in line 5:Menm2 andm3 are left without active edges, therefore they carry
on proposing to women in their next tie, who arew3 andw4 for both men.
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: These four new proposal edges are not preferred strictly to any
other edge, thus no rejection happens.
Phase 2, searching for a critical set in line 11: Since each man has at least one active edge,
the execution switches to the second phase, in which we search for a maximum matching in the
graphGA consisting of the active edges {m1w2,m2w3,m2w4,m3w3,m3w4,m4w2,m5w5,m6w6}. The
neighborhood of {m1,m4} is {w2}, hence it is impossible to match both men with the one proposed
women only. The man left out from this imperfect matching would form a blocking edge withw2.
This set {m1,m4} is the unique set of men with positive deficiency, thus it is the critical set. All
active edges of these men are rejected (lines 10-13), which arem1w2 andm4w2. We switch to Phase 1
(line 14).
Phase 1, rejections in line 4:Menm1 andm4 have no active edge. The proposal tie ofm1 consists
ofw1 andw2, while the proposal tie ofm4 consists ofw2 only. Since no man is incomparable tom1
according to the preferences ofw1, andm1 andm4 are only incomparable to each other atw2, only
m1w2 andm4w2 are rejected (again).
Phase 1, proposals in line 5:Manm1 proposes tow3 andw4, because they build the next tie
on his list. Manm4 proposes tow1. The new proposal edges in this step are {m1w3,m1w4,m4w1}.
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: Sincew1 strictly prefers her new proposal edgem4w1 to all other
edges, she rejectsm1,m2, andm3. All of these rejections are second-time rejections. Neither w3,
norw4 prefersm1 strictly to any other man, thus they do not reject any edge in this step.
Phase 2, searching for a critical set in line 11: Once again, each man has at least one ac-
tive edge, and the execution switches to Phase 2. The graph GA is built by the active edges
{m1w3,m1w4,m2w3,m2w4,m3w3,m3w4,m4w1,m5w5,m6w6}. The critical set in this graph is {m1,
m2,m3}, with neighborhood {w3,w4}. The edges {m1w3,m1w4,m2w3,m2w4,m3w3,m3w4} are all
rejected, and we start Phase 1 again.
Phase 1, rejections in line 4: Menm1,m2 andm3 have no active edge. The only new rejection
triggered by the recently rejected proposal ties of these three men happens alongm5w4, because it
is incomparable to all three rejected edges atw4.
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Phase 1, proposals in line 5:The threemenwith no active edge propose along edgesm1w5,m2w2,
andm3w6.
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: Woman w5 rejects m5, because she strictly prefers her new
proposal edgem1w5 tom5w5. For an analogous reason,w6 rejectsm6. Edgesm1w2 andm4w2 are
rejected again, because the new proposal edgem2w2 is strictly preferred to them byw2.
Phase 1, rejections in line 4: Menm5 andm6 have no active edge. Their proposal tie consists
of one element each (w5 andw6, respectively), and this element appears in a strict preference order
on the women’s side. No rejection happens.
Phase 1, proposals in line 5:Manm5 proposes tow4 along a rejected inactive edge. This is a
new proposal edge. Manm6 proposes tow4 andw5.
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: Since w4 received a proposal from her first-choice man, she
rejects her other 4 (already rejected) edges. No rejection is triggered bym5w4 orm6w5.
Phase 1, rejections in line 4: In the final round of Phase 1, onlym5 is left without an active
edge. His proposal tie isw4, thus edgesm1w4,m2w4, andm3w4 are rejected again.
Phase 1, proposals in line 5: Finally,m5 proposes tow3.
Phase 1, rejections in line 7: As a consequence,w3 rejectsm1,m2, andm3 (again).
Phase 2, searching for a critical set in line 11: Phase 2 starts with the set of active edges
{m1w5,m2w2,m3w6,m4w1,m5w3,m6w4}, because each man has at least one active edge. These
edges form a perfect matching, thus U = ∅. After all, the execution halts and marks the colored
matching as stable, since it covers all women who have ever been proposed to.
4.2 Correctness
We prove Theorem 4.2 via a number of claims, building up the proof as follows. The first three
claims provide the technical footing for the last two claims. Claim 3 is a rather technical observation
about the correctness of the input initialization. An edge appearing in some stable matching is
called a stable edge. Claim 4 shows that no stable edge is ever rejected. Claim 5 proves that all stable
matchings must cover all women who have ever received an offer. Then, Claim 6 proves that if
the algorithm outputs a matching, then it must be stable, and Claim 7 along with its Corollary 4.4
conclude the opposite direction: if stable matchings exist, then one is outputted by our algorithm.
Recall that in line 1, each man in the original instance I is supplemented by an extra woman.
The instance formed is denoted by I ′.
Claim 3. A matching in I ′ is stable if and only if it covers all men in I ′, and its restriction to I is
stable.
Proof. If a matching in I ′ leaves a man u unmatched, then uwu blocks the matching. Thus all
stable matchings in I ′ cover all men. Furthermore, the restriction to I of a stable matching in I ′
cannot be blocked by any edge in I, because this blocking edge also exists in I ′.
A stable matching in I, supplemented by the dummy edges for all unmatched men cannot be
blocked by any edge in I ′, because dummy edges are last-choice edges and regular edges block in
both instances simultaneously. □
Claim 4. No stable edge in I ′ is ever rejected in the algorithm.
Proof. Let us suppose that uw is the first rejected stable edge in I ′ and the corresponding
stable matching isM . There are three rejection calls, in lines 4, 7, and 13. In all cases we derive a
contradiction. Our arguments are illustrated in Figure 4.
• Line 4: rejection was caused by a man u ′ such that u ′ | |wu.
We know that the whole proposal tie of u ′ was rejected. Since M is stable, u ′ must have
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a partner w ′ in M . Since u ′w ′ is a stable edge, it cannot have been rejected previously.
Consequently,w ≺u′ w ′. Thus, u ′w blocksM , which contradicts its stability.
• Line 7: uw was rejected becausew received a proposal from a man u ′ such that u ′ ≺w u.
SinceM is stable, u ′ must have a partnerw ′ inM such thatw ′ ≺u′ w . We also know that u ′
has reachedw with his proposal tie, thus, due to the monotonicity of proposals, u ′w ′ ∈ M
must have been rejected before uw was rejected. This contradicts our assumption that uw
was the first rejected stable edge.
• Line 13: uw was rejected as an active edge incident to the critical setU ′ in GA.
LetW ′ = NGA (U ′), U ′′ = {u ∈ U ′ : M(u) ∈W ′ and uM(u) ∈ E(GA)}, andW ′′ = {w ∈W ′ :
M(w) ∈ U ′ andwM(w) ∈ E(GA)}. In words,W ′ is the neighborhood of the critical set U ′,
while U ′′ andW ′′ represent the men and women inU ′ andW ′ who are matched inM and
the corresponding matching edges are active. Due to our assumption, u ∈ U ′′ andw ∈W ′′.
We claim that |U ′ \U ′′ | < |U ′ | and δ (U ′ \U ′′) ≥ δ (U ′), which contradicts the fact thatU ′ is
critical. We remind the reader that the critical set is the unique set with maximum deficiency,
so that it has the smallest cardinality and it is contained in all other subsets with maximum
deficiency. Since u ∈ U ′′ , ∅, |U ′ \U ′′ | < |U ′ | holds. From their definition we know that
|U ′′ | = |W ′′ |, so it suffices to show that NGA (U ′ \U ′′) ⊆W ′ \W ′′, because in that case
δ(U ′ \U ′′) def= |U ′ \U ′′ | − |NGA (U ′ \U ′′)| ≥ |U ′ \U ′′ | − |W ′ \W ′′ | =
= (|U ′ | − |U ′′ |) − (|W ′ | − |W ′′ |) =
= |U ′ | − |W ′ | def= δ(U ′),
which would prove the second part of our claim.
What remains to show is thatNGA (U ′ \U ′′) ⊆W ′ \W ′′. Suppose the contrary, i.e. that there
exists an edge ab in GA fromU
′ \U ′′ toW ′′. See the third graph in Figure 4. We know that
b ∈ W ′′ by our indirect assumption, hence a′ = M(b) ∈ U ′′ by the definition of U ′′, and
a′ , a, because a < U ′′. Moreover, ab and a′b are edges in GA, thus both of them are active.
Therefore, a | |ba′, for otherwise b would have rejected one of them. In order to keepM stable,
a must be matched in M with some woman b ′. Since no stable edge has been rejected so
far and ab does not blockM , we know that b ′ | |ab, thus b ′ is in a’s proposal tie. Edge ab ′ is
stable and no stable edge has been rejected yet, thus ab ′ is active along with ab. Therefore,
ab ′ ∈ E(GA) and b ′ ∈W ′. Moreover, ab ′ ∈ M , hence a ∈ U ′′ and b ′ ∈W ′′ by the definition











Fig. 4. The three cases in Claim 4. Gray edges are inM . The arrows point to the strictly preferred edges, while
dotted arcs denote incomparability.
Claim 5. Women who have ever had an active edge must be matched in all stable matchings in I ′.
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Proof. Claim 4 shows that stable matchings allocate each man u a partner not better than his
final proposal tie. If a man u proposed to womanw and yetw is unmatched in the stable matching
M , then uw blocksM , which contradicts the stability ofM . □
Claim 6. If our algorithm outputs a matching, then it is stable in I ′.
Proof. We need to show that any maximum matchingM in GA is stable, if it covers all women
who have ever held a proposal. Let M be such a matching. Due to the exit criteria of the second
phase (lines 11 and 12),M covers all men. By contradiction, let us assume thatM is blocked by an
edge uw . This can occur in three cases.
• Whilew is unmatched, u does not preferM(u) tow .
Since uw carried a proposal at the same time or before uM(u) ∈ E(GA) was activated,w is a
woman who has held an offer during the course of the algorithm. We assumed that all these
women are matched inM .
• Whilew ≺u M(u),w does not preferM(w) to u.
The full tie at u containing uw must have been rejected in the algorithm, otherwise uM(u)
would not be an active edge. From our indirect assumption we know that either u ≺w M(w)
or u | |wM(w) holds. If u ≺w M(w), then wM(w) had to be rejected when u proposed to w ,
which contradicts the fact thatwM(w) ∈ E(GA). Hence, u | |wM(w). Thus, after uw and its full
tie was rejected at u,M(w)w also should have been rejected in line 4, which leads to the same
contradiction withwM(w) ∈ E(GA).
• While u ≺w M(w), u does not preferM(u) tow .
Since uM(u) is an active edge, uw has carried a proposal, becauseM(u) is not preferred tow
by u. When uw was proposed along,w should have rejectedM(w)w , to which uw is strictly
preferred. This contradicts our assumption thatwM(w) ∈ E(GA). □
Claim 7. If I ′ admits a stable matchingM ′, then any maximum matchingM in the final GA covers
all women who have ever held a proposal.
Proof. We first show that our algorithm always terminates. As already observed in the descrip-
tion, the algorithm is bound to proceed to the second phase. We now argue that even though from
Phase 1 we proceed to Phase 2, and from Phase 2 it is possible to be sent back to Phase 1, the
two phases cannot be iterated infinitely many times. Before each return to Phase 1 from Phase 2
(line 14), at least one active edge is rejected. Moreover, observe that a man actively proposing his
last-choice dummy woman may not be in the critical set. Hence, such an edge may not be rejected.
On the whole, the critical set will eventually become empty and the algorithm will proceed to the
output phase (line 16).
From Claims 3 and 5 we know thatM ′ covers all women who have ever held a proposal and all
men. It is also obvious that matchingM found in line 16 covers all men, for otherwiseU ′ could not
have been the empty set in line 12 and the execution would have returned to the first phase. This
means that |M | = |M ′ |. On the other hand, all women covered by M ⊆ E(GA) are fit with active
edges in GA. Therefore, women covered by M represent only a subset of women who have ever
had an active edge, i.e. the women covered byM ′. In order toM andM ′ have the same cardinality,
they must cover exactly the same women. Thus, M covers all women who have ever received a
proposal. □
Corollary 4.4. If I admits a stable matching then our algorithm outputs one.
Proof. Courtesy of Claim 7, the outputM covers all women who have ever received a proposal.
According to Claim 6, this matching is stable in I ′, and according to Claim 3, we thus output a
stable matching of I. □
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4.3 Analysis and time complexity
4.3.1 Data representation. The cost of the execution of our algorithm on an instance I is estimated
by the number of accesses to the data structures representing neighbors of vertices and the relations
between them. We suppose that G is represented by adjacency lists belonging to |U | + |W | = n
vertices and that there are |E | =m acceptable man-woman pairs. Since zero-degree vertices do not
interfere with the existence or content of stable matchings, it may be assumed that each vertex has
at least one edge, which results inmax{|U |, |W |} ≤ m, hence n = |U | + |W | ≤ 2m and n = O (m).
Relations in RU are lists with ties, hence they can be incorporated into the adjacency lists by using
a delimiter symbol between ties. However, relations in RW are provided as sets of pairwise relations





ordered pairs of vertices adjacent tow , where
degG (w) denotes the degree ofw in G.
Since the algorithm queries the preference relations at women many times, it pays off to represent
these relations strategically. We transform each womanw ’s preference structure into two bipartite
graphs. These graphs are Gw,≺(U , Ū ) and Gw, | |(U , Ū ), where Ū denotes a copy of the vertex set U .
For Gw,≺(U , Ū ), there is an edge u1u2 ∈ U × Ū if and only if u1 ≺w u2, while for Gw, | |(U , Ū ),
there is an edge u1u2 ∈ U × Ū if and only if u1 | |wu2. The construction of these graphs in the




time. Besides the two graphs, an indexing structure is
constructed for each of them.
Furthermore, all information regarding edges in G are to be maintained. More specifically, the
state of an edge as being an inactive, active, rejected inactive, or rejected proposal edge and whether
it is a new proposal edge is stored. Moreover, for every u ∈ U , we store the fact whether u has been
a vertex because of which edges of type u ′w are rejected where u ′ | |wu (line 4). Reasonable work is
spared if u happens to be in the same role again later.
4.3.2 Analysis. Firstly, a lower bound of the size of input is provided by the size of the graph, as
usual. Note that the set of pairwise relations in RW may be an empty set for any w , so this is a
sharp lower bound. Hence, the input size is Ω(n +m).
Secondly, our algorithm uses the following two primitive operations:
• finding all men u ′ such that u ≺w u ′ for a womanw and rejecting these u ′w ;
• finding edges incomparable to uw atw and rejecting them.
Due to the data structures Gw,≺ and Gw, | | , these operations cost O (1) for each man u ′.




time for each woman. Therefore,



















Adding dummy women to the list of men is done in O (n) time in total. Besides, each edge is
proposed along at most once and proposals are to be made in order of the adjacency list of men,
so the total cost of proposals is O (m). Furthermore, beware that for a given edge uw , rejecting
edges u ′w to whom uw is strictly preferred, and rejecting incomparable edges u ′w are done at
most once, each of them contributing a cost of O (1). The graph GA need not be constructed
separately, since active edges are marked due to our previous considerations. Subsequently, apart
from finding maximum matchings and critical sets in GA, the cost of our algorithm is bounded by
O
(
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As far as maximum matchings and critical sets are concerned, the well-founded technique
described by Irving [19] is reapplied here. As already stated in Section 4.1, the critical set is
calculated from a maximum matching by taking the uncovered men and all men reachable from
the uncovered men via an alternating path. The standard algorithm for determining maximum
matchings launches parallel BFS-algorithms from uncovered men to find augmenting paths. An
interesting property of the execution is that whenever it finishes—because no alternating path
was augmenting—the critical set is computed as well [30]. Therefore critical sets are automatically
yielded with the use of the Hungarian method [27], for which one only needs to store the occurring
vertices.
Although we could apply the Hungarian method in each execution of the second phase, we
wish to reduce the cost of execution by storing information from previous iterations. Note that
the Hungarian method commences from an arbitrary matching and augments that one. Let the
augmentation start from the remnants of the maximum matching found in the previous iteration.
Let Mi , Ci , xi , (i ≥ 1) denote the maximum matching found in the ith iteration of the second
phase, the critical set with respect to Mi , and the number of edges rejected between the i
th
and
(i + 1)th execution of the Hungarian method, respectively. In the first iteration the augmenting path
algorithm is executed from scratch taking O (|U |m) ⊆ O (nm) time. After the ith iteration we reject
xi edges. Since each man inCi had at least one edge inGA, at least (|U | − |Ci |)− (xi − |Ci |) = |U | −xi
men are still paired to women via active edges, if that number is positive. In that case, the (i + 1)th
iteration starts BFS-algorithms from at most xi vertices. Let L be the total number of iterations, in
k of which xi ≥ |U |. In all such cases the computational complexity of calculating the maximum
matching is still upper bounded by the cost of finding a maximum matching from scratch. The time
complexity, therefore, is O (nm + k · |U |m +m∑L−k iter xi ), where the summation is done for the
rest of xi ’s corresponding to the remaining L − k iterations. In the rest of the k iterations |U | ≤ xi ,
therefore |U |k +∑L−k iter xi ≤ ∑Li=1 xi ≤ m, because at mostm edges may be rejected and no edge
is rejected more than once. Hence the running time related to maximum matchings and critical
sets is O (nm +m · (|U |k +∑L−k iter xi )) ⊆ O (nm +m ·m) ⊆ O (m2) .




, while the size of the input is
Ω(n +m). Hence, the algorithm is clearly polynomial.
5 SUPER-STABILITY
In super-stability, an edge outside ofM blocksM if neither of its end vertices prefer their matching
edge to it strictly.
Definition 5.1 (blocking edge for super-stability). Edge uw blocksM , if
(1) uw < M ;
(2) w ≺u M(u) orw | |uM(u);
(3) u ≺w M(w) or u | |wM(w).
The set of already investigated problems is remarkable for super-stability, see Table 1. Up to posets
on both sides, a polynomial algorithm is known to decide whether a stable solution exists [19, 33].
Even though it is not explicitly written there, a blocking edge in the super stable sense is identical
to the definition of a blocking edge given in [11]. It is shown there that if one vertex class has
strictly ordered preference lists and the other vertex class has arbitrary relations, then determining
whether a stable solution exists is NP-complete, but if the second class has asymmetric lists, then
the problem becomes tractable.
We first show that a polynomial algorithm exists up to partially ordered relations on one side
and asymmetric relations on the other side. Our algorithm can be seen as an extension of the one
in [11]. Our added contributions are a more sophisticated proposal routine and the condition on
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stability in the output. These are necessary as men are allowed to have acyclic preferences instead
of strictly ordered lists, as in [11]. Finally, we prove that acyclic relations on both sides make the
problem hard.
5.1 Algorithm
Theorem 5.2. If one side has posets as preferences, while the other side has asymmetric pairwise
preferences, then deciding whether the instance admits a super stable matching (and outputting one, if





We prove this theorem by designing an algorithm that produces a stable matching or a proof for
its nonexistence. For a pseudocode, see Algorithm 3. We assume men to have posets as preferences
and women to have asymmetric relations. We remark that non-empty posets always have a non-
empty set of maximal elements: these are the ones that are not dominated by any other element.
Women in the set of maximal elements are called maximal women.
At start, an arbitrary man proposes to one of his maximal women (lines 28-29). An offer from u is
temporarily accepted byw if and only if u ≺w u ′ for every man u ′ , u who has ever proposed tow
(line 31). This rule forces each woman to reassess her current match every time a new proposal
arrives. Accepted offers are called engagements. The proposal edges or engagements not meeting
the above requirement are immediately deleted from the graph (lines 33-36), in other words, the
corresponding pair is removed from the acceptability relation. Notice that a woman can reject a
proposal even if she is currently not engaged. Each man then reexamines the poset of women still
on his list. If any of the maximal women is not holding an offer from him, then he proposes to her.
The process terminates and the output is generated when no man has maximal women he has not
proposed to. Notice that while women hold at most one proposal at a time, men might have several
engagements at termination. We output the set of engagements as a super stable matching if it is
indeed a matching that covers all women who have ever received a proposal (line 41). In all other
cases, no super stable matching exists (line 43).
Algorithm 3 Super stable matching with posets and asymmetric relations
Input: I = (U ,W ,E,RU ,RW ); RU : posets, RW : asymmetric.
28: while there is a man u who has not proposed to a maximal womanw do
29: u proposes tow
30: if u ≺w u ′ for all u ′ ∈ U who have ever proposed tow then
31: w accepts the proposal of u, uw becomes an engagement
32: else
33: w rejects the proposal and deletes uw
34: end if
35: if w had a previous engagement to u ′ and u ≺w u ′ or u | |wu ′ then
36: w breaks the engagement to u ′ and deletes u ′w
37: end if
38: end while
39: letM be the set of engagements
40: if M is a matching that covers all women who have ever received a proposal then
41: STOP, OUTPUTM and “M is a super stable matching.”
42: else
43: STOP, OUTPUT “There is no super stable matching.”
44: end if
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Example 5.3 illustrates our algorithm.
2
m1 m2 m3 m4













Fig. 5. The input for Example 5.3. Colored dashed edges mark the final matching, while solid gray edges are
the ones rejected in our the algorithm.
Example 5.3. The instance in Figure 5 consist of four men with posets as preferences, and four
women with asymmetric preferences. Numbers on the edges express preferences wherever the
pairwise relations translate into a strict order or a list with ties, which is the case for vertices
m1,m2,m3w1,w3 andw4. Three neighbors ofm4 can be ordered strictly, but there is no information
on his preferences onw1, thus this woman is incomparable to the other three. Aboutw2 we know
that she ranksm1 above all other neighbors, and she has a cyclic preference relation over these
three other neighbors, as shown in the figure. Arrows point towards the preferred edge.
First,m1 proposes to his sole maximal womanw1, and they become engaged. Then,m2 proposes
to the same woman, who now reconsiders her match, rejectsm1 (because of line 36) and acceptsm2
instead (because of line 31). Nowm2 proposes tow2 as well, because she is a maximal woman, and
they become engaged. Similarly tom2,m3 also proposes to both of his neighbors, and gets engaged
to both of them. Then,w2 rejectsm2, sincem3 ≺w2 m2. The final man,m4 proposes to his maximal
womenw1 andw2. The first one rejects the proposal, while the latter one accepts the it and turns
down the offer fromm2. The current set of engagements is thus {m2w1,m3w3,m4w2}. The only man
who has a maximal woman he has not proposed to ism1, therefore, he proposes next. This proposal
is made to w2, who accepts it and rejects her current partnerm4. This triggers a proposal along
m4w4, which becomes an engagement. Since no man has a maximal woman he has not proposed
to, the algorithm terminates here. The set of engagements {m1w2,m2w1,m3w3,m4w4} is indeed a
matching that covers all women who ever received a proposal, thus it is a super stable matching.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of our algorithm. Theorem 5.4 is supported in one
direction by Claim 8, in the other direction by Claims 9 to 12.
Theorem 5.4. The output of Algorithm 3 is a matching that covers all women who ever received a
proposal if and only if the instance admits a stable matching.
Claim 8. If the output of the algorithm is a matching that covers all women who ever received a
proposal, then it is stable.
Proof. Assume that an edge uw blocks the output matchingM . We investigate two cases.
• Man u has proposed tow .
Since uw was rejected andw is covered inM , we know thatw got engaged to a manM(w),
for whomM(w) ≺w u holds. This contradicts our assumption on uw being a blocking edge.
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• Man u has not proposed tow .
The only reason for u not proposing to w is that w has never been a maximal woman for
u, i.e. even at termination, u had an engagement edge strictly preferred to uw . SinceM is a
matching, this edge must be uM(u). The relationM(u) ≺u w contradicts our assumption on
uw being a blocking edge. □
Claim 9. If an edge was deleted in the algorithm, then no stable matching contains it.
Proof. Let uw be the first edge deleted by the algorithm, even though it is part of a stable
matching S . The reason of the deletion was thatw received an offer from u ′, for which u ′ ≺w u or
u ′ | |wu. Sinceu ′w < S does not block S ,u ′ is matched in S and S(u ′) ≺u′ w . Due to themonotonicity of
proposals, u ′ had proposed to S(u ′) before proposing tow , but u ′S(u ′) was deleted. This contradicts
our assumption on uw being the first deleted stable edge. □
Claim 10. If a womanw has ever received a proposal in our algorithm, thenw must be matched in
all stable matchings.
Proof. Assume that uw carried a proposal at some point, yetw is unmatched in a stable match-
ing S . In order to stop uw from blocking S , u needs to be matched in S and S(u) ≺u w . This implies
that uS(u) was deleted before the proposal along uw was sent, which contradicts Claim 9. □
Claim 11. If there is a stable matching S , then the set of engagements M computed in line 39 is a
matching.
Proof. As already mentioned, the only reason forM not being a matching can be that a man
has more than one edge inM . On the other hand, each of the women covered byM have degree 1
inM and they are all matched in S , due to Claim 10. This is only possible if there is a man u who
is matched in S , but not covered byM . To stay unmatched inM , u must have proposed to and be
rejected by all women adjacent to him, including S(u). This contradicts our Claim 9 on stable edges
never being rejected by the algorithm. □
Claim 12. If there is a stable matching S , then the set of engagementsM computed in line 39 covers
all women who have ever received a proposal.
Proof. We will show a stronger statement, claiming that M covers all women matched in S .
Due to Claim 10, which states that women covered by an arbitrarily chosen stable matching are a
superset of women covered byM ,M then covers all women who have ever received a proposal.
Claim 11 shows that M is in fact a matching, thus, the symmetric difference M△S consists of
alternating paths and cycles. Our goal is to show that no alternating path can start at a w ∈ W
vertex with an edge in S .
Assume the contrary. Claim 9 proves that uw ∈ S \M has never been proposed along. Otherwise,
uw < M was deleted, in which case uw ∈ S cannot hold. This implies that u has a partner inM and
he prefersM(u) strictly tow . To stop uM(u) from blocking S ,M(u) must have a partner in S who is
strictly preferred to u. Just as before, this edge has never carried a proposal, otherwise uM(u) could
not be in M . These arguments can be iterated, and thus the assumed alternating path can never
end, which is a contradiction to the finiteness of the graph. □
Analysis and time complexity of Algorithm 3. We use a similar data structure to the one
applied in the analysis of Algorithms 1 and 2. The only difference emerges from the poset preference
structure on the men’s side. We store the entire partial order for each man, given as a Hasse diagram
of the underlying directed acyclic graph of the poset. The Hasse diagram provides a non-redundant
representation of a poset. Formally, the Hasse diagram is a directed acyclic graph whose vertices
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are the elements of the finite poset and there is an edge between vertices a and b if and only if
a ≺ b and there exists no element c such that a ≺ c ≺ b holds. Each man is equipped with a
dummy woman, from whom there is a directed edge to all initially maximal women. The cost of
the execution is again measured in the number of accesses to these data structures.
Similarly to the implementation of our strongly stable algorithm, it is worth constructing a
special structure Gw,⪰(U , Ū ) for each womanw , where Ū again denotes a copy of the vertex setU
and there is an edge u1u2 ∈ U × Ū if and only if u2 ≺w u1 or u1 | |wu2. The construction of this





Since the set of relations can be empty as well, the size of the input is analogously lower bounded
by Ω (n +m). The assumption of Hasse diagrams allows a straightforward check whether all
maximal women have been proposed to. The initial maximal set is the women directly connected
to the dummy woman. Each time a woman w turns down a proposal, the candidates for being
promoted to maximal state are the women adjacent tow in the Hasse diagram. Therefore the cost
of submitting proposals does not exceed O (m). The rest of the while loop, from lines 30 to 36,
concerns the asymmetric relations on the woman’s side.
One needs to iterate through the relations belonging to womanw and check whether the new
proposal fromU is strictly preferred to all previous proposals, and whether the previous engager u ′
is strictly preferred to u. This primitive operation is done through the structureGw,⪰(U , Ū ). One
only needs to analyze whether there is at least one neighbor of u who has already proposed tow .
The same property is checked for u ′. The cost of these operations is O (n). Deleted edges are kept
in our data structure with a label “rejected”, so that previous proposals can be checked. Finally,
the computation of M and the examination of the output condition can be done in O (m) time,











We complete the study of all cases for super-stability with the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5. If both sides have acyclic pairwise preferences, then determining whether a super
stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if each agent finds at most four other agents acceptable.
Proof. The NP-complete problem we reduce to our problem is again (2,2)-e3-sat [4]. Our
construction follows the same logic as the one in the proof of Theorem 3.4, however, the preferences
are set differently, see Figure 6.
The vertex and edge sets created to B is identical to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.4. To
each variable x in B, we create vertices t , x̄ , f , and x , and to each clause in B, we create vertices
u1,u2,u3,w1,w2, andw3. The edge set inside each variable gadget comprises a 4-cycle t , x̄ , f ,x . A
clause gadget consists of a complete bipartite graph on the six created vertices, where each vertex
on the u-side is equipped with exactly one interconnecting edge, each of which runs from the
u-vertex to vertex x or x̄ in the variable gadget of the literal. If the literal is positive, then the other
end vertex of this edge is x in the corresponding variable gadget, otherwise it is x̄ .
The preferences of each vertex restricted to the edges that are not interconnecting edges can be
represented by a strictly ordered list. At x , each interconnecting edge xui is incomparable to x f and
worse than xt , and the same holds for x̄ . At ui , the interconnecting edge xui or x̄ui is incomparable
to uiw3, and it is worse than uiw1 and uiw2.
Claim 13. If there is a truth assignment that satisfies the Boolean formula B, then there is a super
stable matching in G.
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t : strict list: x ≺ x̄
f : strict list: x̄ ≺ x
x : f ≺ t , t ≺ u,u | | f
x̄ : t ≺ f , t ≺ u,u | | f
u1 : w1 ≺ x/x̄ ,w2 ≺ x/x̄ ,x/x̄ | |w3; strict list:w1 ≺ w3 ≺ w2
u2 : w1 ≺ x/x̄ ,w2 ≺ x/x̄ ,x/x̄ | |w3; strict list:w3 ≺ w2 ≺ w1
u3 : w1 ≺ x/x̄ ,w2 ≺ x/x̄ ,x/x̄ | |w3; strict list:w2 ≺ w1 ≺ w3
w1 : strict list: u2 ≺ u3 ≺ u1
w2 : strict list: u1 ≺ u2 ≺ u3






























Fig. 6. A variable gadget to the left and a clause gadget to the right. Interconnecting edges are dashed. The
arrows point to the preferred edge, while dotted arcs denote incomparability.
Proof. In each variable gadget belonging to a true variable, {tx , f x̄} is chosen, whereas all
gadgets corresponding to a false variable contribute matching { f x , tx̄}. In each clause, there is at
least one true literal. The vertex representing the appearance of this literal is matched to w3 in
the clause gadget, while the remaining four vertices are coupled up in such a way that no edge
inside of the gadget blocks. This is possible, because {u1w1,u2w3,u3w2}, {u1w2,u2w1,u3w3}, and
{u1w3,u2w2,u3w1} are all stable matchings. The reason why the literal satisfying the clause was
chosen to be matched to w3 is that its matching edge in the variable gadget is strictly preferred
to its interconnecting edge, and thus the interconnecting edge does not block M . Due to the
strict preferences inside gadgets, it is easy to check that no other edge blocks the constructed
matching. □
Claim 14. If there is a super stable matchingM inG , then there is a truth assignment that satisfies B.
Proof. If either t or f is unmatched in M , then at least one of their x and x̄ vertices is either
unmatched or it is matched along an interconnecting edge. In both cases, this vertex has a blocking
edge leading to the unmatched t or f . With this we have already shown three statements:
(1) for each variable gadget, either {tx , f x̄} ∈ M or { f x , tx̄} ∈ M ;
(2) no interconnecting edge appears inM ;
(3) M is perfect in each clause gadget, since stable matchings are inclusionwise maximal match-
ings.
From the last point we can see that in each clause gadget, exactly two u-vertices are matched to
partners strictly preferred to their interconnecting edge. Therefore, each clause gadget has exactly
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one interconnecting edge that is incomparable to the edge in M at the clause gadget. In order
to ensure stability, this edge must be worse than the edge in M at its variable gadget. This only
happens if the corresponding literal is satisfied in the truth assignment. We have now proved that
each clause is satisfied. □
With this, we have completed our hardness proof. □
6 THE STABLE ROOMMATES PROBLEM
In this section, we determine the complexity of finding a weakly, strongly, and super stable matching
in non-bipartite instances, depending on the preference structure of the agents. Then we extend
the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem for the most general setting, remark on structural results
related to this theorem, and also pose some open questions.
6.1 Complexity results
The six degrees of orderedness can be interpreted in the non-bipartite stable roommates problem
as well. For strictly ordered preferences, all three notions of stability reduce to the classical stable
roommates problem, which can be solved in O (m) time [18]. The weakly stable variant becomes
NP-complete already if ties are present [36]. The strongly stable version with ties can be solved
in polynomial time [28, 37], but it is NP-complete for posets [23]. For super-stability, there is an
O (m) time algorithm for preferences ordered as posets [20], while the case with acyclic preferences
was shown in Theorem 5.5 to be NP-complete for bipartite instances as well. Hence, because
of the trivial reduction of the bipartite problem to the more general, non-bipartite problem, the
super-stable roommates problem with structures that are at least as general as acyclic preferences, is
NP-complete. Due to our new results, the complexity analysis of all cases has thus been completed.
We summarize the known and the new results in Table 2.
strict ties poset acyclic asymmetric arbitrary
WEAK O (m) [14] NPC [36] NPC [36] NPC [36] NPC [36] NPC [36]
STRONG O (m) [14] O (nm) [28, 37] NPC [23] NPC [23] NPC [23] NPC [23]
SUPER O (m) [14] O (m) [20] O (m) [20] NPC NPC NPC
Table 2. The complexity table for the stable roommates problem with pairwise preferences. Unlike in Table 1,
rows here represent the three stability notions, while columns stand for the degree of orderedness in each
agent’s preferences. The colored fields mark our contribution, and they follow from Theorem 5.5.
6.2 Structural results
The Rural Hospitals Theorem for strict lists [15] states that the set of matched vertices is identical
in all stable matchings. In the case of preferences with ties, the theorem has been shown to hold
for strongly and super stable matchings even for non-bipartite instances [21, 32], and fail for
weak stability even for bipartite graphs. We show here that the positive results carry over even to
asymmetric pairwise preferences.
Theorem 6.1. In an instance of the strongly/super stable roommates problem with asymmetric
pairwise preferences, all stable matchings cover the same set of vertices.
Proof. We rely on the usual alternating path argument. Assume that there is a vertex v that is
covered by a stable matchingM1, but left uncovered by another stable matchingM2. Then, for both
strong and super stability,M1(v) must strictly prefer its partner inM2 to v , otherwise edge vM1(v)
blocksM2. Iterating this argument, we derive that such a v cannot exist in a finite graph. □
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We remark that the Rural Hospitals Theorem does not hold for arbitrary preferences, not even
for bipartite instances. In the instance consisting of one man u and two womenw1 andw2, so that
w1 ∼u w2, both uw1 and uw2 are strongly and super stable matchings.
The Rural Hospitals Theorem often indicates a rich underlying structure of the set of stable
matchings. Such results were shown in the case of preferences with ties [28], and occasionally even
for posets [32].
Bipartite instances. Strongly stable matchings are known to form a distributive lattice [32],
and there is a partial order with O (m) elements representing all strongly stable matchings [29].
However, once posets are allowed in the preferences, the lattice structure falls apart [32]. The set
of super stable matchings has been shown to form a distributive lattice even if preferences are
expressed in the form of posets [32, 38]. The questions arise naturally: does this distributive lattice
structure carry over to more advanced preference structures in the super stable case? Also, even if
no distributive lattice exists on the set of strongly stable matchings, is there any other structure
and if so, how far does it extend in terms of orderedness of preferences?
Non-bipartite instances. For strong stability in the presence of ties in lists, Kunysz [28] showed
that there exists a partial order with O (m) elements representing the set of all strongly stable
matchings, and he also gave an O (nm) algorithm for constructing such a representation. For super
stable matchings with posets, Fleiner et al. [13] gave algorithms for computing all super stable
pairs, enumerating all super stable matchings, and finding a minimum regret super stable matching.
Similar structural results for preferences given as more involved relations are not known for either
of the two stability notions, and they are left for future research.
7 OPEN PROBLEM




-time algorithm computing a strongly stable matching or
reporting that none exists, given an instance of the stable marriage problem with ties on one side,
and asymmetric pairwise preferences on the other side. This matches the complexity shown by
Irving [19] under the same stability criteria, but with ties on both sides in a complete instance. The
completeness of the preferences was later relaxed by Manlove [31], who ensured the same time
complexity. Kavitha et al. [26] designed a breakthrough O (nm)-algorithm for the latter problem,
by introducing the notion of a level defined on vertices, edges, and matchings. Each execution of
their algorithm is a particular execution of the algorithm of Manlove [31]. However, the algorithm
from [26] makes sure to always keep the actual matching level-maximal, which allows to share
the cost of the execution among women and to upper bound the individual cost by O (m). It is an
interesting question whether this approach could be applied in a way to reduce the complexity
of our algorithm. It seems to be challenging to implement the idea in our case for the following
reason. The upper bound given by Kavitha et al. [26] is proven by a simple observation that holds
for the algorithms designed by Irving [19] and Manlove [31]: any woman may only keep proposals
from her last tie. Hence, whenever a woman receives a new proposal edge, she either keeps all of
her previous proposal edges, or drops all of them. This is a property that clearly does not even hold
when applying partially ordered sets for women. Hence, the direct application of the technique is
not effortless, and thus its extension would be a nice contribution.
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